

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

5 JUL 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Donald C. Latham  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

SUBJECT: Computer Security Center Review of DCI SAFEGUARDS

1. I appreciate your sending us a copy of the DoD Computer Security Center's (CSC) review of the DCI's SAFEGUARDS document. In substance, it seems less a serious indictment than fresh evidence that we need to work more closely together to get on with improving computer security. Our analysis (summary attached) indicates the DoD CSC was unaware that the SAFEGUARDS focus entirely on providing implementable, near-term security improvements to identified "critical systems" and are not intended to be a long-term, general prescription for computer security. Other flaws perceived by DoD CSC are largely disagreements about terminology and its interpretation rather than fundamental differences. We are prepared to work closely with NTISSC and the DoD CSC to resolve such problems.

2. At the same time, however, we need your cooperation in moving, as rapidly as possible, to do all that is technically and operationally feasible in the near term to improve the security of the critical systems identified by the DCI.



John N. McMahon

Attachment:  
As Stated

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All portions of this memorandum  
are classified SECRET.



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ICS 85-8076

2 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: DoD Computer Security Center Comments on DCI SAFEGUARDS

1. Attached per your request, are two versions of a proposed response to Don Latham's note of 10 June which sent us a copy of the DoD Computer Security Center (CSC) comments on the DCI SAFEGUARDS. The difference between the two versions is that the former includes, as an attachment, a summary of our analysis of CSC's review, while the latter simply alludes to that analysis.

2. In the interim we have been meeting with [REDACTED] Director, Computer Security Center, NSA, in an effort to sort out procedural and bureaucratic issues so that we can get on with the business of computer security. We are told that, until [REDACTED] of the IHC staff briefed him last week, [REDACTED] did not realize that the SAFEGUARDS are applicable only to near-term fixes for the specifically identified critical systems, a misunderstanding that is apparent in his letter to Don Latham.

[REDACTED]  
Vice Admiral, USN

Attachments:  
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SUBJECT: DoD Computer Security Center Comments  
on DCI SAFEGUARDS

Distribution: ICS 85-8076

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ICS/IHC,  (1 Jul 85)

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## SUMMARY OF COMMENTS ON THE DoD CSC's ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENT

The chief concern expressed by the DoD CSC is that the SAFEGUARDS document allows multilevel and compartmented modes of operation of Intelligence Community (IC) automated systems using security-related software which is not in the operating system. According to the DoD CSC's recommendation, this should never be allowed. However, there is currently only one operating system listed on the DoD CSC's Evaluated Products List (EPL) that meets the Center's criteria for a trusted operating system. This new product has good security, but is limited in processing power and in the software support capabilities that are the key ingredient for providing the information processing services required to support critical IC functions.

Therefore, if the DoD CSC recommendation was adopted today as policy for the IC's "critical system," all strategic SIGINT and IMINT collection and processing operations would have to be suspended until major hardware/software systems were replaced and applications software and DBMSs converted to operate on the new equipment. In addition, several critical DoD intelligence systems supporting the U&S Command and major Service components would have to be shut down.

The SAFEGUARDS address the identified "critical systems" and are intended to provide them near-term security enhancement. They are intended to be consistent with the DoD Criteria to the degree possible, but principally reflect direction by the DDCI that security enhancements specified had to be realistically achievable and the cost of implementing them had to be estimated before they could be mandated. This accounts for variation in the SAFEGUARDS as compared to the criteria in the areas of trusted path, trusted distribution, and configuration management. As noted in paragraph 6 of the DoD CSC cover letter, "cover channels" are not included in the SAFEGUARDS because no existing "critical systems" can support this technical requirement.

Many of the Center's comments are interpretations of security requirements stated in the SAFEGUARDS. There is no disagreement with most of these interpretations. However, they clearly do not indicate flaws in the SAFEGUARDS. Similarly, a number of the editorial problems identified by DoD CSC reflect its review of an interim draft of the SAFEGUARDS document rather than the final, published version which had already been corrected.

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